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+RZ(OLWH&KLQHVH6WXGHQWV9LHZ2WKHU
&RXQWULHV)LQGLQJVIURPD6XUYH\LQ
7KUHH7RS%HLMLQJ8QLYHUVLWLHV
0LQ=+28
Abstract: This study examines Chinese university students’ feelings 
towards foreign countries, using original high-quality survey data 
collected in 2014 at three top universities in Beijing. First, elite Chine-
se students’ perceptions of specific countries are revealed. Being from 
top universities, these individuals will have great influence on China’s 
future politics and international relations. It is thus important to gauge 
their perceptions of other countries. They generally feel warmly to-
wards the European Union, Russia, and the United States, but har-
bour cold feelings towards Northeast Asian neighbours (Japan and 
the two Koreas). Second, this study finds that the effects of the 
socio-demographic and political factors underlying students’ feelings 
differ greatly from country to country. I construct various social pro-
files of the students (dis)liking particular countries. Third, this study 
establishes a connection between nationalism and feelings towards 
particular countries. Chinese nationalism is not equally targeted at all 
other countries. While it elevates animosity mainly against Japan and 
the US, it promotes a closer rapport with North Korea and Russia. 
 Manuscript received 17 March 2018; accepted 29 January 2019 
Keywords: China, Chinese nationalism, Chinese students, political 
ideology, public opinion 
Dr. Min Zhou is an associate professor of Sociology at the Universi-
ty of Victoria. His research focuses on various forms and conse-
quences of global social change. He has published articles on global 
economic networks, international organisations, global public opin-
ion, and transnational social movements. His latest project investi-
gates the role of social networks in political activities and labour mar-
kets in China.  
E-mail: <minzhou@uvic.ca> 
 
  168 Min Zhou 

,QWURGXFWLRQ
There has been very scarce scientifically collected data on Chinese 
perceptions of foreign countries. As a result, we know very little 
about how the Chinese perceive other nations of the world, let alone 
how the perception of one country differs from another or how these 
views vary across different social groups. Most of what we know 
comes from anecdotal evidence that may not well represent the Chi-
nese, and may even be misleading. One notable exception is the study 
by Gries and Sanders (2016), in which they find that Chinese netizens 
feel most warmly towards the European Union, followed by the 
United States, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, and lastly Japan. 
That study is based on an Internet survey, however. While it does 
indeed shed light on the perceptions of those active on the Internet, 
the convenience sample used limits its ability to be generalised.  
This study1 fills this gap. Using original survey data from strict 
probability sampling, it examines how students from three top uni-
versities in Beijing feel about six countries and territories, including 
major global powers – the EU, Russia, and the US – and important 
Northeast Asian neighbours – Japan, North Korea, and South Korea. 
This research also has the potential to generate new insights into 
Chinese nationalism. Nationalism and nationalist sentiment among 
the Chinese have received considerable attention in both the public 
media and academia. Research on nationalism in China is often criti-
cised for its lack of solid empirical substance (Carlson 2009: 21).  
A key concern about the perceived increase in Chinese national-
ism is whether it will trigger aggression against other countries. 
Obviously, individuals do not hold the same feelings towards all for-
eign countries equally, and some of the latter are more likely to bear 
the brunt of China’s popular nationalism. As it continues its rise in 
the global economy and international politics, China inevitably shares 
more common interest with certain countries while encountering 
more conflicts over real, historical, or symbolic matters with others. 
This empirical study will shed light, then, on whether elite students in 
China view other countries more as friends or foes.  

1 This research was funded by an Insight Grant from the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) of Canada. The data used in this study 
are available online at: <www.minzhou.ca/data.html>. 
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For the purpose of this research, a large-scale survey was con-
ducted at three top universities in Beijing – Peking University (PKU), 
Tsinghua University (THU), and Renmin University of China (RUC) – 
in June 2014. The survey collected information on students’ feelings 
towards the EU, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the 
US. The choice of these six countries and territories was not random. 
In the pilot survey conducted at the same universities, these geo-
graphical locations were ranked as the top six that students perceive 
to be the most important in China’s foreign relations (in the order of 
the US, Russia, the EU, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea). The 
three Beijing universities were chosen due to their prominent social 
and political influences. Students from these higher learning institu-
tions often play a pioneering role in public opinions and social 
movements involving foreign countries (Yu and Zhao 2006). Moreo-
ver, the three are among the most prestigious in China and are “train-
ing grounds for the country’s future elite” (Hoffmann and Larner 
2013: 201). Their students are likely to assume leading future roles in 
society. Therefore, it is crucial to gauge their feelings towards foreign 
countries (Chen 2011; Sinkkonen 2013; Yu and Zhao 2006; Zhao 
2003).  
Using the original data, this study is intended to address two in-
terrelated questions. First, it reveals and compares students’ feelings 
towards different countries. Second, it employs multivariate regres-
sion techniques to examine what socio-demographic and political 
factors influence students’ feelings towards a particular country and 
constructs different social profiles of the students liking or disliking 
particular ones.  
)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV)RUHLJQ&RXQWULHVLQ&KLQD
Some scholars contend that nationalism is an important source of 
legitimacy for the Chinese government, and that the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP) often manipulates such sentiment to shore up its 
own governing of the country (Gries 2004; Wang 2012; Zhao 2004). 
At the same time, more and more scholars also realise that Chinese 
society is not merely passively influenced by the government. Public 
opinions and popular sentiments themselves also affect the govern-
ment’s foreign policies (Gries 2004; Johnston 2004). The Chinese 
leadership is increasingly sensitive to public perceptions of a given 
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country in making foreign policies that involve it (Gries et al. 2011). 
Some even assert that the Chinese government is increasingly willing 
to follow popular nationalistic sentiments and thus adopt confronta-
tional and assertive behaviour against certain other countries (Zhao 
2013). In light of this impact of public opinion on China’s foreign 
policies, it is worth examining how the public feels about certain 
other countries and comparing how they are liked or disliked by the 
individuals in question.  
Empirical studies have begun paying attention to popular feel-
ings towards a particular country in today’s China. For instance, there 
seems to be a popular basis for mistrust against the US (Gries and 
Sanders 2016), and nationalism is found to have an impact on tough-
er US policies (Gries et al. 2011). In contrast, others find no evidence 
of anti-American nationalism among elite students (Zhao 2002). Stu-
dents view the US more as a superpower than as an enemy, and it is 
“difficult for radical anti-US nationalism to achieve domination in 
China” (Zhao 2002: 905). Various studies point out widespread anti-
Japanese nationalism among the Chinese public (He 2007; Reilly 
2012; Weiss 2014; Zhou and Wang 2016). This negative public senti-
ment is viewed as a powerful driver of China’s Japan policy (Gries, 
Steiger, and Wang 2016). Based on a large Internet survey, Gries 
(2012) studies Chinese netizens’ feelings towards the Koreas and 
reveals cold ones towards both states. Existing studies usually focus 
on the Chinese perception of a particular country and thus are unable 
to situate public opinions in a comparative perspective; that is, how 
the Chinese feel about one country relative to another. One notable 
exception is the aforementioned study by Gries and Sanders (2016), 
but theirs is based on a convenience sample from an Internet survey.  
The Chinese government is particularly sensitive to public opin-
ions from “students and young people in urban areas,” as they are 
most likely to “participate in protest movements over foreign policy 
issues” (Sinkkonen 2013: 1046). Consequently, this segment of the 
population is “most likely of greatest concern to Chinese leaders” 
(Reilly 2012: 126). Meanwhile, the CCP increasingly tends to recruit 
its elite members or even future leaders from among highly educated 
young people – especially those from top universities. It is thus essen-
tial to gauge elite Chinese students’ perceptions of foreign countries.  
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3RWHQWLDO&RUUHODWHVRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV
)RUHLJQ&RXQWULHV
I draw on existing empirical studies on Chinese nationalism for po-
tential factors underlying individuals’ feelings towards certain foreign 
countries. Both socio-demographic and political factors have influ-
ence herein. Socio-demographic factors are those more observable, 
and “objective” attributes. In contrast, political factors are about 
individuals’ political orientation and identity – hence they are less 
directly observable, and more “subjective.” 
6RFLR'HPRJUDSKLF)DFWRUV
Commonly studied socio-demographic correlates of Chinese nation-
alism include gender, age, residence, hukou (ᡧਓ) type (urban or ru-
ral), family income, CCP membership, ethnic background (Han or 
non-Han minority), the university at which individuals study, and the 
region where they lived before coming to Beijing (see Gries et al. 
2011; Gries and Sanders 2016; Hoffmann and Larner 2013; Sinkko-
nen 2013; Tang and Darr 2012; Zhou and Wang 2016). 
The effects of these variables are not always consistent in the lit-
erature, however. While some studies claim that females are more 
nationalistic in China (Hoffmann and Larner 2013), most find no 
significant difference between genders (Gries 2012; Gries et al. 2011; 
Gries and Sanders 2016; Tang and Darr 2012; Sinkkonen 2013). The 
effect of age is also debated. Some find older Chinese to be more 
nationalistic (Hoffmann and Larner 2013), but others observe no 
effect of age (Gries and Sanders 2016). Individuals from rural areas 
are mostly found to be more nationalistic than their urban counter-
parts (Hoffmann and Larner 2013; Sinkkonen 2013; Tang and Darr 
2012), but no difference between rural and urban residents is found 
in other cases (Gries et al. 2011; Gries and Sanders 2016). Income is 
usually found to be negatively related to nationalism, and better-off 
individuals display less such sentiment (Tang and Darr 2012).  
Ethnicity is generally found to have no significant association 
with the level of nationalism (Gries and Sanders 2016; Sinkkonen 
2013; Tang and Darr 2012). CCP members are often found to be 
more nationalistic than non-CCP members (Tang and Darr 2012; 
Sinkkonen 2013). In some cases, however, the latter demonstrate 
greater nationalism. For instance, non-CCP members prefer tougher 
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foreign policies against the US (Gries et al. 2011). The university at 
which participants study also matters for nationalism. Among the 
three elite ones, students from PKU are often found to be the least 
nationalistic, followed by those from RUC, while those from THU 
are the most nationalistic (Chen 2011; Sinkkonen 2013). 
I contend that this mixed evidence is likely due to the neglect of 
the variation in the effects of the socio-demographic factors underly-
ing feelings towards different countries. I do not assume that these 
socio-demographic factors affect students’ feelings towards different 
countries in the same way. A factor’s effect on feelings towards the 
US can, for example, be very different from that on those towards 
Russia. Due to the potentially differential effects of the same factors, 
the social profiles of the students who favour (or disfavour) particular 
countries can differ. For instance, it is possible that the social profile 
of pro-US students differs greatly from that of pro-Russia ones. 
3ROLWLFDO)DFWRUV
Political ideology and nationalist identity also influence individuals’ 
feelings towards foreign countries. Political ideology (liberal or con-
servative) is likely to shape individuals’ perceptions in this regard. For 
instance, it divides liberals and conservatives over foreign affairs in 
the US (Gries 2014). A similar ideological divide may also be discern-
ible in China. Individuals with a conservative orientation prefer to 
maintain China’s current system rather than carry out further re-
forms, whereas liberal-oriented ones put more emphasis on further 
such reforms than the stability of the current system. Political systems 
in liberal democratic countries are congruent with this liberal orienta-
tion, and are thus likely to be more appealing to the latter. According-
ly, liberal individuals may develop warmer feelings towards such 
countries. In contrast, to the conservatives who hope to maintain the 
stability of China’s current system, the image of liberal democracies 
may be a less favourable one. I empirically explore, therefore, the 
possibility of an ideological divide in feelings towards respective 
countries.  
Chinese nationalist identity, commonly defined as a belief in 
China’s superiority over other nation states (Gries 2012: 50; Koster-
man and Feshbach 1989: 261; Sinkkonen 2013: 1047), is often as-
sumed to be closely related to anti-foreigner perceptions and senti-
ments (Gries et al. 2011; Gries, Steiger, and Wang 2016; Reilly 2012; 
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Wang 2012; Zhao 2004). Nevertheless, little attention has been paid 
to its potentially differing effect on feelings towards respective coun-
tries. Consequently, we do not know whether it always leads to worsen-
ing feelings towards all countries or if it can actually have no effect – or 
even promote positive feelings towards certain ones. I thus explicitly 
examine this relationship, and investigate whether nationalist identity 
is associated with negative feelings towards each and every other 
country. The revealed relationship will shed light on which ones are 
most likely to bear the brunt of Chinese nationalism. 
'DWDDQG9DULDEOHV
A large-scale survey was conducted at three top universities (PKU, 
THU, and RUC) in Beijing, in June 2014 (Zhou and Wang 2016). The 
survey collected information on students’ feelings towards other 
countries, and the factors potentially affecting these. The survey se-
lected participants according to a carefully designed procedure of 
probability sampling.  
The sampling method used is a modified form of two-stage clus-
tering sampling, based on the type of on-campus student dormitory. 
At all three universities, almost all students live on campus except for 
a very few married graduate ones. There are different types of dormi-
tory room used, with one to six students living in them. To guarantee 
the representativeness of the final sample, we first sampled dormitory 
rooms from each room type, and then selected one or two students 
from each selected room. We chose one student from dormitory 
rooms with three or fewer students, and two students from dormitory 
rooms with four or more students to complete the questionnaires.  
The varying probabilities for a student being selected in different 
room types require separate sampling. Eventually, the probability of a 
student being selected in the final sample is the product of the prob-
abilities at two stages: that is, (1) the probability of each room being 
selected times (2) the probability of each person being selected from 
the room in question. We set this probability to be the sample size 
divided by the population size. In other words, in our sampling 
scheme all students have an equal chance of being selected in the 
final sample. 
Take THU, for example. There are 3,811 double, 2,670 triple, 
and 3,528 quadruple rooms that altogether house over 29,700 stu-
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dents between them. A total of 500 questionnaires were expected to 
be distributed at THU. To ensure that all the students had the same 
chance of being selected as survey participants, we calculated that 128 
double, 135 triple, and 118 quadruple rooms should be selected. To 
select these, systematic sampling was applied within each type of 
dormitory room. Then one student in each of the selected double and 
triple rooms and two students in each of the selected quadruple ones 
were selected randomly by interviewers to complete the question-
naire. In so doing, every student at THU had the equal probability 
(0.017) of being selected in the sample. Similar sampling procedures 
were used at PKU and RUC too. 
When conducting the survey we anticipated the potential prob-
lem of self-censorship, and tried our best to minimise its impact. The 
survey was totally anonymous and self-administered. The survey con-
ductors left the questionnaires for the respondents to complete by 
themselves, and when coming back to collect the completed ones 
they mixed the returned questionnaires together in a large envelope. 
There is no way to match completed questionnaires with specific 
individuals. Respondents were informed of this total anonymity be-
fore completing questionnaires.  
The data contain 1,458 students in total; among them, 504 from 
PKU, 467 from THU, and 487 from RUC. The sample consists of 
788 male students (54.05 per cent) and 670 female students (45.95 per 
cent). Sampled students are from all 22 of China’s provinces, five 
autonomous regions, four municipalities, two special administrative 
regions (Hong Kong and Macau), and from Taiwan. The average age 
is 22 years old. Undergraduate and graduate students account for 67 
per cent and 33 per cent of the participants, respectively. Sampled 
students are predominantly Han nationals (89.71 per cent), with the 
remaining 10.29 per cent from minority ethnic groups. These num-
bers are consistent with the overall profile of the student body in 
these universities. Because of the carefully designed probability sam-
pling, the final sample represents well the student population of the 
three universities.  
'HSHQGHQW9DULDEOH
The feeling towards a particular country is captured by the question: 
“How do you feel about [the name of the country] in general?” I 
measure the responses on the following five-point scale: “Dislike it 
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very much” (1); “Dislike it somewhat” (2); “Neutral” (3); “Like it 
somewhat” (4); and, “Like it very much” (5). Hence higher scores 
suggest warmer feelings towards a particular country, while lower 
ones indicate more negative such sentiments.  
,QGHSHQGHQW9DULDEOHV
Gender is a binary variable, with males coded as 1 and females as 0. 
Age is measured in years. Residence or hukou type is binary, with rural 
residents coded as 1 and urban ones as 0. Family income is measured 
through the question: “How much is your parents’ total monthly 
income approximately?” The possible responses are situated on a 
nine-point scale: lower than CNY 1,000 (1); CNY 1,000–2,000 (2); 
CNY 2,000–4,000 (3); CNY 4,000–6,000 (4); CNY 6,000–8,000 (5); 
CNY 8,000–10,000 (6); CNY 10,000–15,000 (7); CNY 15,000–20,000 
(8); and, over CNY 20,000 (9). A larger number indicates greater 
family income.  
CCP membership is a binary variable, with 1 indicating CCP 
member and 0 non-CCP member. Ethnicity is measured as a binary 
variable, with Han coded as 1 and non-Han as 0. University type is a 
set of dummy variables; I use PKU as the reference group, and in-
clude RUC and THU in the analysis. Region is measured by a series 
of dummy variables. I use the commonly recognised geographic re-
gions in mainland China including “East China” (Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shandong), “Northeast China” 
(Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang), “North China” (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Hebei, Shanxi, and Inner Mongolia), “Central China” (Henan, Hubei, 
and Hunan), “South China” (Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan), 
“Northwest China” (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xin-
jiang), and “Southwest China” (Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yun-
nan, and Tibet). Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan are not directly 
governed by the Chinese government, and are collectively classified 
as “other.”   
Political ideology is self-reported, and based on the question: 
“Between maintaining stability (㔤ᣔっᇊ, weihu wending) and deepen-
ing reforms (␡ॆ᭩䶙, shenhua gaige), which one do you think is more 
important for today’s China?” Those who emphasise stability are 
considered as conservative, whereas those who prefer reforms are 
coded as liberal. I measure nationalist identity by two questions used 
in the National Identity module of the International Social Survey 
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Program: (1) I would rather be a citizen of China than of any other 
country and (2) The world would be a better place if other countries 
were more like China. Responses are situated on a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). I use 
factor analysis to create a composite variable out of the two ques-
tions, so as to capture the level of nationalist identity.  
5HVXOWV
&RPSDULVRQRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV'LIIHUHQW&RXQWULHV
Table 1 below summarises all the variables used in the analysis. On 
average students’ feelings towards the six countries and territories are 
ranked as follows (from the most positive to the most negative): Rus-
sia, the EU, the US, South Korea, Japan, and finally North Korea. 
Given the considerable attention paid to China’s anti-Japanese senti-
ments and protests in the existing literature and mass media, we 
would have thought Chinese students dislike Japan the most. Surpris-
ingly, overall students hold the most negative feelings towards North 
Korea, a long-time ally of China (at least in the latter’s official dis-
course). Since these feelings are measured on a five-point scale and 3 
is the middle point, scores above 3 suggest positive feelings and 
scores below it indicate negative ones. We can see that students gen-
erally hold positive feelings towards Russia, the EU, and the US while 
being negative about the three neighbours of Japan, North Korea, 
and South Korea. 
Figure 1 below displays the comparison of students’ feelings to-
wards the six countries and territories. Both the EU and Russia are 
well liked by the surveyed students, with very few disliking either. 
Between the two, while slightly more students like Russia there are 
also slightly more who dislike it too. Hence, there is somewhat more 
variation in students’ feelings towards Russia than the EU. At the 
bottom of the rankings, North Korea and Japan are the least-liked 
countries. Japan receives the largest number of “dislike very much” 
responses, whereas North Korea has the highest percentage of dislike 
overall (including “dislike very much” and “somewhat dislike”). Feel-
ings towards Japan are relatively more polarised, as there are also 
more students liking that country as compared to North Korea. 
While negative feelings towards the island nation are well document-
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ed in the literature on anti-Japanese sentiments (Gries, Steiger, and 
Wang 2016; He 2007; Reilly 2012; Weiss 2014), the revealed cold 
feelings towards North Korea definitely merit further research.  
7DEOH 'HVFULSWLYH6WDWLVWLFVIRU9DULDEOHV8VHGLQWKH$QDO\VLV
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Feelings towards the EU   3.420 .722 1 5 
Feelings towards the US 3.138 .810 1 5 
Feelings towards Russia 3.427 .734 1 5 
Feelings towards Japan 2.453 .989 1 5 
Feelings towards South Korea 2.738 .847 1 5 
Feelings towards North Korea 2.375 .801 1 5 
Age 21.808 2.768 17 38 
Gender (male) .540 .499 0 1 
Ethnicity (Han) .904 .295 0 1 
Residence (rural) .217 .412 0 1 
Family income 5.222 2.003 1 9 
CCP membership .314 .464 0 1 
Political ideology (conservative) .419 .494 0 1 
Nationalism 0 1 -2.398 2.077 
Region:  
  East China .270 .444 0 1 
  Northeast China .097 .297 0 1 
  North China .192 .394 0 1 
  Central China .161 .368 0 1 
  South China .079 .255 0 1 
  Southwest China .114 .318 0 1 
  Northwest China .077 .266 0 1 
  Other (non-mainland China) .010 .101 0 1 

 
 
 
 
 

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)LJXUH)HHOLQJVWRZDUGVWKH6L[&RXQWULHVDQG7HUULWRULHV

6RFLR'HPRJUDSKLF&RUUHODWHVRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV
3DUWLFXODU&RXQWULHV
Next, I employ multivariate regression techniques to examine the 
effects of various factors on students’ feelings towards particular 
countries. Because the dependent variable is on a five-point scale and 
thus an ordinal variable, I choose ordinal logistic regression and apply 
it to the six countries and territories individually. Results are present-
ed in Table 2 below. 
Some independent variables have statistically significant effects, 
while others do not. Moreover, the same independent variable does 
not always have the same effect across all countries. Feelings towards 
different countries are associated with different combinations of so-
cio-demographic factors. Based on the results in Table 2 below, be-
low I discuss how these effects differ from one country to another: 
Gender. This has a significant effect on feelings towards all 
countries except North Korea. Specifically, female students hold 
more positive feelings towards the EU, the US, Japan, and South 
Korea than their male counterparts. In contrast, male students tend 
to like Russia more than female students do. There is no gender dif-
ference in feelings towards North Korea. 
Age. This only shows a significant effect on feelings towards the 
US and Japan. Older students develop more positive feelings toward 
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those two countries. Age shows no effect on feelings towards the 
other ones studied.  
7DEOH 2UGLQDO/RJLVWLF5HJUHVVLRQRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV3DUWLFXODU
&RXQWULHV
Variable EU US Russia 
Gender (male) -.615
*** 
(.109) 
-.529*** 
(.108)
.410*** 
(.109) 
Age -.003 (.021)
.107*** 
(.022)
.002 
(.021) 
Residence (rural) .009 (.139)
.053 
(.136)
.150 
(.137) 
Family income .083
** 
(.029)
.074** 
(.028)
-.007 
(.029) 
Ethnicity (Han) -.183 (.182)
.155 
(.177)
-.199 
(.179) 
CCP membership -.058 (.123)
-.418** 
(.124)
-.241* 
(.121) 
University: Reference group: PKU 
    RUC -.091 (.128)
.137 
(.127)
.184 
(.129) 
    THU -.175 (.132)
-.154 
(.131)
-.345** 
(.131) 
Region: Reference group: Central China 
    East China .088 (.161)
-.021 
(.161)
.020 
(.163) 
    Northeast China -.127 (.177)
-.100 
(.206)
.341 
(.208) 
    North China -.084 (.177)
.086 
(.176)
.159 
(.177) 
    South China .165 (.229)
.052 
(.229)
-.055 
(.235) 
    Southwest China .051 (.202)
.319 
(.198)
-.025 
(.201) 
    Northwest China -.353 (.229)
.176 
(.223)
.199 
(.227) 
    Non-mainland China 1.158 (.708)
.824 
(.674)
-1.432* 
(.609) 
R2 .101 .128 .083 

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Variable Japan S. Korea N. Korea 
Gender (male) -.554
*** 
(.104)
-.494*** 
(.107)
-.022 
(.105)
Age .059
** 
(.021)
.036 
(.021)
-.030 
(.021)
Residence (rural) -.151 (.127)
.287 
(.163)
.022 
(.131)
Family income .066
* 
(.027)
-.025 
(.028)
-.065* 
(.028)
Ethnicity (Han) -.043 (.172)
.055 
(.178)
-.152 
(.182)
CCP membership -.318
** 
(.117)
.120 
(.121)
-.073 
(.120)
University: Reference group: PKU 
    RUC -.060 (.121)
.128 
(.126)
.347** 
(.124)
    THU -.093 (.125)
-.280* 
(.128)
.352** 
(.133)
Region: Reference group: Central China 
    East China .017 (.154)
.017 
(.159)
-.078 
(.156)
    Northeast China -.192 (.203)
.035 
(.204)
.056 
(.203)
    North China -.077 (.168)
.128 
(.175)
.225 
(.173)
    South China .287 (.222)
.418 
(.235)
.121 
(.229)
    Southwest China .316 (.189)
.053 
(.197)
.136 
(.195)
    Northwest China -.045 (.219)
.237 
(.221)
-.080 
(.223)
    Non-mainland China 1.654
** 
(.587)
.803 
(.622)
.244 
(.578)
R2 .103 .079 .039
1RWHV: 1 QXPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHVWDQGDUGHUURUVIURPWZR
WDLOHGWHVWV333
Residence (hukou) type. There is no difference in feelings towards 
any of the countries between urban and rural students.  
Family income. This has a significantly positive effect on the 
EU, the US, and Japan, whereas it shows a significantly negative ef-
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fect on North Korea. It reveals no effect on Russia and South Korea. 
Students from better-off families tend to like the EU, the US, and 
Japan more, while those from less well-off ones feel more warmly 
towards North Korea.  
Ethnicity. There is no difference in feelings towards any of the 
six countries and territories between Han students and those from 
minority ethnic groups.  
CCP membership. This shows a significantly negative effect on 
feelings towards the US, Russia, and Japan, while it has no effect on 
those towards the EU, South Korea, and North Korea.  
University. There are no differences in students’ feelings across 
the three universities regarding the EU, the US, and Japan. Neverthe-
less, feelings towards Russia and the two Koreas differ between the 
respective schools. Students from PKU adopt more negative feelings 
towards North Korea than those from THU and RUC. Tsinghua 
students hold colder feelings towards Russia and South Korea, com-
pared with those from the other two universities.  
Region. No significant differences are found between the major 
regions within mainland China. However, there are significant differ-
ences between students from mainland China and those from outside 
it (including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) in their feelings to-
wards Japan and Russia. Students from outside mainland China like 
Japan significantly more than mainland Chinese ones do. Meanwhile, 
the former tend to show less warm feelings towards Russia.  
3ROLWLFDO&RUUHODWHVRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV3DUWLFXODU
&RXQWULHV
I further investigate how students’ political orientation, such as ideol-
ogy and nationalism, is related to feelings towards other countries. 
With all the socio-demographic variables held under control, I incor-
porate political ideology and nationalist identity into the ordinal lo-
gistic regression model. Estimated results are presented in Table 3. 
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7DEOH 2UGLQDO/RJLVWLF5HJUHVVLRQLQFOXGLQJ3ROLWLFDO,GHRORJ\DQG
1DWLRQDOLVW,GHQWLW\
Variable EU US Russia 
Gender (male) -.592
*** 
(.114) 
-.446*** 
(.113)
.416*** 
(.114)
Age -.016 (.023)
.082*** 
(.023)
.018 
(.022)
Residence (rural) -.021 (.145)
.019 
(.142)
.184 
(.144)
Family income .086
** 
(.030)
.060* 
(.029)
.008 
(.030)
Ethnicity (Han) -.133 (.190)
.225 
(.186)
-.241 
(.187)
CCP membership -.022 (.130)
-.331** 
(.129)
-.305* 
(.129)
University: Reference group: PKU 
    RUC -.127 (.134)
.132 
(.133)
.197 
(.135)
    THU -.233 (.137)
-.218 
(.136)
-.364** 
(.136)
Region: Reference group: Central China 
    East China .114 (.168)
-.046 
(.167)
.055 
(.169)
    Northeast China -.062 (.218)
-.030 
(.216)
.341 
(.217)
    North China -.096 (.185)
.128 
(.185)
.199 
(.184)
    South China .149 (.239)
-.107 
(.237)
-.034 
(.244)
    Southwest China .005 (.210)
.330 
(.207)
-.011 
(.211)
    Northwest China -.370 (.241)
.228 
(.235)
.209 
(.237)
    Non-mainland China 1.114 (.710)
.789 
(.682)
-1.400* 
(.603)
Ideology (conservative) -.453
*** 
(.112)
-.416*** 
(.111)
-.140 
(.111)
Nationalism -.078 (.058)
-.370*** 
(.058)
.303*** 
(.058)
R2 .141 .221 .140

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Variable Japan S. Korea N. Korea 
Gender (male) -.497
*** 
(.109)
-.477*** 
(.112)
-.097 
(.110) 
Age .043
* 
(.021)
.027 
(.022)
-.026 
(.022) 
Residence (rural) -.172 (.134)
.256 
(.139)
.007 
(.138) 
Family income .058
* 
(.028)
-.025 
(.029)
-.061* 
(.029) 
Ethnicity (Han) -.071 (.179)
.008 
(.185)
-.238 
(.191) 
CCP membership -.240
* 
(.121)
.116 
(.126)
-.117 
(.125) 
University: Reference group: PKU 
    RUC -.048 (.127)
.122 
(.132)
.306* 
(.130) 
    THU -.132 (.130)
-.338* 
(.132)
.299* 
(.133) 
Region: Reference group: Central China 
    East China .079 (.161)
.037 
(.165)
.015 
(.162) 
    Northeast China -.110 (.213)
.023 
(.213)
.148 
(.210) 
    North China .044 (.176)
.144 
(.182)
.332 
(.180) 
    South China .300 (.230)
.426 
(.242)
.206 
(.237) 
    Southwest China .356 (.196)
.009 
(.204)
.158 
(.204) 
    Northwest China .023 (.230)
.200 
(.231)
-.082 
(.233) 
    Non-mainland China 1.680
** 
(.602)
.820 
(.622)
.477 
(.576) 
Ideology (conservative) -.294
** 
(.105)
-.207 
(.108)
.039 
(.107) 
Nationalism -.430
*** 
(.055)
-.031 
(.056)
.268*** 
(.056) 
R2 .209 .087 .080 
1RWHV 1 QXPEHUVLQSDUHQWKHVHVDUHVWDQGDUGHUURUVIURPWZR
WDLOHGWHVWV333WKHUHIHUHQFHJURXSIRUWKH
LGHRORJ\YDULDEOHLVOLEHUDO
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The effects of the socio-demographic variables are substantively the 
same as discussed above. Here I focus on the effects of the two new-
ly added political variables: 
Political ideology. I distinguish between conservative and liber-
al orientations. Between maintaining stability and deepening reforms, 
conservative students give more priority to stability while liberal stu-
dents prefer more reforms. Political conservatism is significantly re-
lated to the dislike of the EU, the US, and Japan, while having no 
significant effect on feelings towards Russia and the two Koreas. 
Conservative students are more likely to dislike the EU, the US, and 
Japan, whereas liberal students tend to hold warmer feelings towards 
the three.  
Nationalist identity. The effect of this shows three diverging 
patterns. First, nationalist identity has a significantly negative effect 
on feelings towards the US and Japan; second, it displays a signifi-
cantly positive effect on feelings towards Russia and North Korea; 
third, it has no significant relationship with feelings towards the EU 
and South Korea. Hence more nationalistic individuals are likely to 
develop greater negative feelings towards the US and Japan, while 
showing warmer ones towards Russia and North Korea.  
The social profile of the students who (dis)like the US and Japan 
is particularly distinguishable. In comparison with other countries, a 
greater number of socio-demographic and political variables have 
significant effects on feelings towards these two countries and can 
explain the increased variation among students (i.e. greater R2 of the 
models). In other words, feelings towards the US and Japan display 
more predictable patterns. In contrast, feelings towards the two Ko-
reas are not so set among students and thus we are less able to pre-
dict them using students’ characteristics. The predictability of feelings 
towards the EU and Russia is somewhere in between these two poles. 
&RQFOXVLRQDQG'LVFXVVLRQ
This study makes three main contributions to the literature. First, it 
reveals elite Chinese students’ perceptions of specific countries using 
high-quality representative data. These individuals are from top uni-
versities, and will have great influence on China’s future politics and 
international relations. It is thus important to gauge their perceptions 
of other countries. They generally feel warmly towards Russia, the 
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EU, and the US, but harbour cold feelings towards the three North-
east Asian neighbours.  
Second, this study finds that the effects of the socio-demograph-
ic and political factors on students’ feelings differ greatly from coun-
try to country. Based on the results presented in this paper, social 
profiles of the students (dis)liking particular countries can be con-
structed. These social profiles are summarised in Table 4 below. 
Third, this study establishes a clear connection between Chinese na-
tionalism and feelings towards particular countries. Such sentiment is 
not equally targeted at all other countries. While it elevates animosity 
against Japan and the US, it promotes a closer rapport with Russia 
and North Korea. 
7DEOH 7KH&RUUHODWHVRI)HHOLQJVWRZDUGV3DUWLFXODU&RXQWULHV
Feelings towards: EU US Russia Japan S. Korea N. Korea 
Male î î + î î  
Female + + î + +  
Age  +  +   
Family income + +  +  î 
CCP member  î î î   
Mainland China   + î   
Non-mainland   î +   
Conservative î  î  î   
Liberal + +  +   
Nationalism  î + î  + 
1RWHV SRVLWLYHHIIHFWíQHJDWLYHHIIHFWEODQNFHOOQRHIIHFW7+8VWXGHQWV
KROGPRUHQHJDWLYHIHHOLQJVWRZDUGV5XVVLDDQG6RXWK.RUHDZKLOH3.8RQHV
GHPRQVWUDWHPRUHQHJDWLYHIHHOLQJVWRZDUGVVSHFLILFDOO\1RUWK.RUHDWKHUH
DUHQRVLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQUXUDODQGXUEDQVWXGHQWVRUEHWZHHQ
+DQDQGQRQ+DQVWXGHQWV
Several patterns are worthy of closer attention here, and call for fur-
ther in-depth research. Female students show a greater liking of 
Western or developed countries and territories while male students 
tend to feel closer to Russia. In future, it would be interesting to dig 
deeper into this gender difference. For instance, the soft power of 
Western or developed countries – such as American, European, Japan-
ese, and South Korean popular cultures – may be more appealing to 
women than men in China, thereby constructing a more attractive 
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image of these countries among the former. Why men show warmer 
feelings towards Russia than women is also an intriguing topic worth 
investigating. 
Older students display warmer feelings towards the US and Japan. 
In future research, we may wish to disentangle the cohort effect and 
the age effect to better understand this finding. We would like to 
discover whether this is due to the difference in cohorts (e.g. older 
cohorts were exposed to less nationalist education and propaganda 
than younger ones were) or the difference in age (e.g. as students get 
older, they gradually see the US and Japan differently and their im-
pressions of the two countries improve).  
Students from wealthier family backgrounds tend to like Western 
and developed countries more, whereas those from poorer families 
hold warmer feelings towards North Korea. Western and Japanese 
popular culture and sociopolitical systems may appeal more to afflu-
ent individuals. For the less well-off, they are more likely to be losing 
out in China’s socio-economic transformations. The image of North 
Korea, often reminiscent of pre-reform China, is thus probably more 
likely to win them over.  
CCP members tend to develop less favourable feelings towards 
China’s potential geopolitical competitors, such as the US, Russia, 
and Japan. The EU and the two Koreas are much less likely to pose a 
challenge to China, and CCP members and non-members do not 
differ in their feelings towards these countries and territories. Geo-
politics may have a greater impact on perceptions of foreign countries 
for CCP members than for non-members. 
Mainland Chinese students hold significantly warmer feelings 
towards Russia and colder ones towards Japan than their non-
mainland counterparts do. This result may suggest that mainland 
China’s education and media construct a more favourable image of 
Russia and a more negative one of Japan when compared with those 
impressions conveyed outside mainland China.  
Conservative students are more likely to dislike liberal democrat-
ic countries and territories such as the EU, the US, and Japan. The 
disliking of liberal democracies is hence congruent with their personal 
conservative orientation. In contrast, liberal students tend to like 
these countries and territories more. Liberal students hope to see 
more reforms in China, and the liberal democratic models in place in 
the EU, the US, and Japan may be more appealing to them.  
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Nationalism is not related to students’ feelings towards all coun-
tries in the same way. In particular, Japan and the US are most likely 
to bear the brunt of Chinese nationalist fervour. Nationalistic stu-
dents hold more negative sentiments towards these two countries, 
and probably see them as threats or even enemies. Russia and North 
Korea actually benefit from Chinese nationalism, and thus may be 
perceived by students holding such feelings as potential allies (espe-
cially ones against the US and Japan).  
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